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Abstract In this paper, we propose a new extension of the run-to-the-bank rule
for bankruptcy situations to the class of multi-issue allocation situations. We show
that this rule always yields a core element and that it satisfies self-duality. We
characterise our rule by means of a new consistency property, issue-consistency.
Keywords Cooperative games · Multi-issue allocation · Bankruptcy · Self-duality ·
Consistency
1 Introduction
In a bankruptcy situation (O’Neill 1982), one has to divide a given amount of money
(estate) amongst a set of agents, each of whom has a claim on the estate. The total
amount claimed typically exceeds the estate available, so not all the claims of the
agents can be fully satisfied. Calleja et al. (2005) extend this model to encompass
situations in which the agents can have multiple claims on the estate, each as a
result of a particular issue. For such multi-issue allocation (MIA) situations they
propose an extension of the run-to-the-bank (RTB) rule of O’Neill as solution for
this new class of problems. As is the case for the original rule, this extended RTB
rule turns out to coincide with the Shapley value of the corresponding MIA game.
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Contrary to bankruptcy games, however, MIA games need not be convex. Con-
sequently, there exist MIA situations for which the RTB solution is not a core
element of the corresponding game. In this paper, we extend the RTB rule in a
different way, such that it always yields a core element.
Instead of considering the issues and the players combined, as in Calleja et al.
(2005), we propose a two-stage extension: first, we explicitly allocate the estate to
the issues (according to a marginal vector), and then, within each issue the money
is divided among the agents using the standard RTB rule. An alternative view on
composite solution is given in Casas-Méndez et al. (2005).
Based on Aumann and Maschler (1985), we define the concept of self-dual-
ity for MIA situations and show that the composite RTB rule is self-dual. Fi-
nally, we characterise our composite extension by means of the property of issue-
consistency, which generalises the consistency property that was first used by
O’Neill (1982).
This paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the bankruptcy and
MIA models and define the bankruptcy RTB rule. In Sect. 3, we define our com-
posite extension of this rule and show that this rule always yields a core element.
In Sect. 4, we define self-duality and prove that the composite RTB rule satisfies
this property. Finally, in Sect. 5, we characterise the composite RTB rule by means
of issue-consistency and we show that this rule is estate monotonic.
2 Multi-issue allocation situations
A bankruptcy situation (O’Neill 1982) is a triple (N , E, c), where N is a finite set
of n players, E ≥ 0 is the estate under contest and c ∈ RN+ is the vector of claims
such that
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E .
With each bankruptcy situation (N , E, c) a bankruptcy game can be associated
with set of players N and characteristic function vE,c, which assigns to each coa-
lition S ⊂ N the part of the estate that is left for the players in S after the claims












for all S ⊂ N . A nice overview of the bankruptcy literature is provided by Thomson
(2003).
A MIA situation (Calleja et al. 2005) is a quadruplet (N , R, E, C), where N ,
as above, is the set of players, R is the finite set of r issues, E ≥ 0 is the estate
and C ∈ RR×N+ is the matrix of claims. We assume that
∑
k∈R,i∈N cki ≥ E ,∑
k∈R cki > 0 for all i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N cki > 0 for all k ∈ R.
Given a matrix C , we denote by Ck the kth row of C , and by C−k the matrix
C without the kth row. Furthermore, we denote ckS = ∑i∈S cki for S ⊂ N and
cK i = ∑k∈K cki for K ⊂ R. In this way, the sum of the components of Ck is
denoted by ck N , and the total claim of player i ∈ N is cRi .
A permutation τ on R is a bijection τ : {1, . . . , r} → R, where τ(p) denotes
which element of R is at position p. The set of all r ! permutations on R is denoted
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by (R). The reverse permutation of τ , τrev ∈ (R), is defined by τrev(p) =
τ(r + 1 − p) for all p ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
For a MIA situation (N , R, E, C), we define a corresponding MIA game by
assigning to each coalition S the minimum amount they can guarantee themselves
if the players in N\S are free to choose an order on the issues and the players, where
we assume that an issue cannot be dealt with until the previous one is completed.













So, the issues τ(1), . . . , τ (tτ ) will be entirely satisfied for all the players, whereas
the issue τ(tτ + 1) will only be partially satisfied (if any), with the amount Eτ =
E − ∑tτp=1 cτ(p)N . The remaining issues are not handled at all according to τ . In




cτ(p)S + max{0, Eτ − cτ(tτ +1),N\S}.
Then the MIA game is given by the function
vE,C (S) = min
τ∈(R) fS(τ )
for all S ⊂ N . Note that this MIA game corresponds to the Q-approach in Calleja
et al. (2005).
A bankruptcy situation (N , E, c) can be viewed as a MIA situation (N , R,
E, C) in two ways
1. |R| = 1 and C = c,
2. R = N and C = diag(c), i.e., the claim matrix is the diagonal matrix with the
elements of c on the diagonal.
A bankruptcy rule is a function f assigning to every bankruptcy situation (N , E, c)
a vector f (N , E, c) ∈ RN such that
1. 0 ≤ fi (N , E, c) ≤ ci for all i ∈ N ,
2.
∑
i∈N fi (N , E, c) = E .
A well-known example of a bankruptcy rule is the RTB rule, introduced by O’Neill
(1982), although under a different name (recursive completion). This rule turns out
to coincide with the Shapley value of the corresponding bankruptcy game. In Sect. 3
we give a definition of this rule.
A MIA rule is a function g assigning to every MIA situation (N , R, E, C) a
vector g(N , R, E, C) ∈ RN such that
1. 0 ≤ gi (N , R, E, C) ≤ cRi for all i ∈ N ,
2.
∑
i∈N gi (N , R, E, C) = E .
Calleja et al. (2005) extends the RTB rule to the class of MIA situations and shows
that this RTB rule coincides with the Shapley value of the corresponding MIA
game.
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3 The composite RTB rule
In this section, we extend the RTB rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of
MIA situations. Contrary to the extension in Calleja et al. (2005), our rule (mRTB)
involves multiple runs to the bank, one by the issues and within each issue by the
players.
In order to introduce the mRTB rule, we first define the RTB rule in terms
of marginal vectors. Given a cooperative game with player set N and character-
istic function v, we define for each permutation σ ∈ (N ) the marginal vector
mσ (v) by
mσσ(p)(v) = v({σ(1), . . . , σ (p)}) − v({σ(1), . . . , σ (p − 1)})
for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The RTB rule for bankruptcy situations (cf. O’Neill 1982) coincides with the
Shapley value and can thus be expressed as





Let (N , R, E, C) be a MIA situation. We denote the bankruptcy game corre-
sponding to the situation (R, E, (ck N )k∈R) by vRE,C .
For τ ∈ (R) and σ ∈ (N ), we define the composite marginal vector as
mmτ,σ (N , R, E, C) =
∑
k∈R
mσ (vxk ,Ck ),
where x = mτ (vRE,C ).
The set of all composite marginal vectors is a subset of the core of the corre-
sponding MIA game, where the core of a game v is defined by
Core(v) =
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N






Proposition 1 Let (N , R, E, C) be a MIA situation. Then
mmτ,σ (N , R, E, C) ∈ Core(vE,C )
for all τ ∈ (R), σ ∈ (N ).
Proof Let τ ∈ (R), σ ∈ (N ) and let z = mmτ,σ (N , R, E, C). Let x be the
marginal vector mτ (vRE,C ) and t = tτrev [as defined in (1)]. With xk as estate for issue
k ∈ R, we have a collection of bankruptcy situations {(N , xk, Ck)}k∈R . However,
at most one of them is a nontrivial situation: in the situations τ(1), . . . , τ (r − t −1)
the estate equals zero, and in the situations τ(r − t +1), . . . , τ (r) the estate equals
the sum of all the claims. Let y be the marginal vector corresponding to σ of the
only possible nontrivial bankruptcy situation (N , xτ(r−t), Cτ(r−t)):
y = mσ (vxτ(r−t),Cτ(r−t) ).
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We can express z as






i∈N zi = E = vE,C (N ). Next, let S ⊂ N . Then∑
i∈S zi ≥ fS(τrev), because in issue τ(r − t), the members of S receive at least
max{0, Eτrev − cτ(r−t),N\S} according to y. From this,
∑
i∈S zi ≥ vE,C (S) follows
and hence, z ∈ Core(vE,C ). 
A general relation of inclusion between the set of marginal vectors and the set
of composite marginal vectors cannot be established, as it is shown in the following
example.
Example 1 Let (N , R, E, C) be the MIA situation with N = {1, 2, 3}, R = {1, 2},
estate E = 10, and claim matrix C = ( 9 5 03 7 7
)
. The game associated with this situ-
ation is
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
vE,C (S) 0 0 0 3 3 1 10
The sets of marginal and composite marginal vectors can be easily calculated. The
results are given in the following tables.
σ ∈ (N ) mσ (vE,C )
123 (0, 3, 7)
132 (0, 7, 3)
213 (3, 0, 7)
231 (9, 0, 1)
312 (3, 7, 0)
321 (9, 1, 0)
τ ∈ (R) σ ∈ (N ) mmτ,σ (N , R, E, C)
12 123 (0, 3, 7)
132 (0, 7, 3)
213, 231 (3, 0, 7)
312, 321 (3, 7, 0)
21 123, 132, 312 (5, 5, 0)
213, 231, 321 (9, 1, 0)
The tables show that m231(vE,C ) is not a composite marginal vector and that
mm21,123(N , R, E, C) does not belong to the set of marginal vectors of the game
vE,C . 
Now we define the mRTB rule, which extends the RTB rule for bankruptcy
situations to the class of MIA situations.
Definition 1 Let (N , R, E, C) be a MIA situation. The mRTB rule is defined by






RTB(N , mτk (v
R
E,C ), Ck). (2)
The mRTB rule can be interpreted as the result of two races: first, the issues
“run to the bank” for the money, and next, there are r races among the claimants
within each issue. As is the case for the RTB rule for bankruptcy situations, the
claims are satisfied as much as possible by the order of arrival.
This mRTB rule first takes the marginal vectors of the “issue game” vRE,C . Asso-
ciated with each marginal vector mτ (vRE,C ) we have r bankruptcy games whose
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estates are given by the components of the marginal vector. Next, we take for each
player the sum of the RTB solutions of these r situations. Finally, the average
among all the marginals is computed. It is readily seen that the mRTB rule can be
expressed as








mmτ,σ (N , R, E, C). (3)
If we start with a bankruptcy situation (N , E, c) and construct one of the two
corresponding MIA situations (N , R, E, C) as indicated in Sect. 2, then
RTB(N , E, c) = mRTB(N , R, E, C). So, the mRTB rule is indeed an extension
of the RTB rule. It follows immediately from the definition of the Shapley value
Sh (cf. Shapley 1953) that






Sh(N , vxk ,Ck ),
where x = mτ (vRE,C ). However, the mRTB solution of (N , R, E, C) does not in
general coincide with the Shapley value of the corresponding game vE,C . In fact,
the mRTB rule is not even game-theoretic, i.e., two situations leading to the same
game might yield different outcomes, as the following example shows.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2}, R = {1, 2}, E = 2, C = ( 1 30 1
)
and C ′ = ( 1 31 1
)
. Then
the two MIA situations (N , R, E, C) and (N , R, E, C ′) give raise the same MIA
game:
S {1} {2} N
vE,C (S) 0 1 2
vE,C ′ (S) 0 1 2
However, mRTB(N , R, E, C) = ( 12 , 32 ) 
= mRTB(N , R, E, C ′) = ( 34 , 54 ). 
The mRTB rule provides a way of obtaining an element of the core of a MIA
game without calculating the characteristic function. This is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 Let (N , R, E, C) be a MIA situation. Then
mRTB(N , R, E, C) ∈ Core(vE,C ).
Proof In Proposition 1, we show that every composite marginal vector lies in the
core. The mRTB outcome, being the average of these composite marginals vectors
according to Eq. (3), then also is an element of the core, which is a convex set. 
As an alternative to the mRTB rule, another way to extend the RTB rule in a
two-stage way would be to apply the RTB rule twice:
∑
k∈R RTB(N , xk, Ck) with
x = RTB(R, E, (ck N )k∈R). However, this solution can lie outside the core of the
corresponding MIA game, as the next example shows.
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Fig. 1 Proof of Lemma 1
Example 3 Consider the MIA situation (N , R, E, C) with N = {1, 2, 3}, R =









The game associated with this situation is
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
vE,C (S) 16 3 22 21 46 27 51
We have x = RTB(R, E, (ck N )k∈R) = ( 163 , 673 , 703 ) and
∑







2 < 3 = vE,C ({2}), this solution is not in the core of vE,C . Note
that mRTB(N , R, E, C) = ( 653 , 236 , 1536 ) ∈ Core(vE,C ). 
4 Self-duality
For a MIA situation (N , R, E, C) we denote D(S) = cRS , i.e., the total claim
of the players in coalition S, and we define D = D(N ). Recall that we assume
D ≥ E .
Lemma 1 Let (N , R, E, C) be a MIA situation. Then
vE,C (S) = vD−E,C (N\S) + D(S) − D + E .
Proof To calculate the value of vE,C (S), we must find a permutation on the issues
τ ∈ (R) such that the total amount fS(τ ) assigned to coalition S is minimal. In
the definition of fS(τ ), there is an implicit permutation σ ∈ (N ) on the players,
which puts the members of S at the back.
In Fig. 1 we represent all the claims of matrix C in the order indicated by τ
and σ , i.e., cτ(1)σ (1), cτ(1)σ (2), . . . , cτ(r)σ (n). The claims of the members of S are
shaded. The total of the claims is divided into two parts of lengths E and D − E ,
as the figure shows. From the way in which τ is chosen, the dark zone in the E
part is as small as possible, and has length vE,C (S).
If now we consider the MIA situation (N , R, D − E, C) and we want to cal-
culate vD−E,C (N\S), we must find a permutation τ ′ ∈ (R) such that the white
zone in the D − E segment is minimised. Looking at Fig. 1 from the right hand
side, one can see that this minimum is obtained for τrev (with implicit permutation
σrev on the players).
Furthermore, we have that the E segment is the sum of its white and shaded
parts. The white part within E equals the total white zone D(N\S) minus the white
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zone in the D − E segment, which has length vD−E,C (N\S). As the shaded part
of E has length vE,C (S),
E = vE,C (S) + D(N\S) − vD−E,C (N\S).
From the equality D = D(S) + D(N\S), we conclude that the statement holds. 
The next lemma gives us the relation between the marginal vectors of the two
MIA games with estates E and D − E .
Lemma 2 For the marginal vectors of the games corresponding to the MIA situ-
ations (N , R, E, C) and (N , R, D − E, C), we have
mσ (vE,C ) = ((cRi )i∈N ) − mσrev(vD−E,C )
for each σ ∈ (N ).
Proof Let σ ∈ (N ) and p ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let i = σ(p) and let S be the coalition
{σ(1), . . . , σ (p − 1)}. Then
mσi (vE,C ) = vE,C (S ∪ {i}) − vE,C (S).
Using Lemma 1, we have
mσi (vE,C ) = vD−E,C (N\(S ∪ {i})) + D(S ∪ {i}) − D + E
−[vD−E,C (N\S) + D(S) − D + E]
= D({i}) + vD−E,C (N\(S ∪ {i})) − vD−E,C (N\S)
= D({i}) − mσrevi (vD−E,C ).
Since D({i}) = cRi , the result follows. 
Following Aumann and Maschler (1985), given a rule f we can define its dual
f ∗ by using f to share not the estate E but the gap D − E . So, each player receives
his claim (the amount he would receive if the estate were big enough) minus his
share (according to f ) of the losses:
f ∗(N , R, E, C) = (cRi )i∈N − f (N , R, D − E, C).
A rule is called self-dual if f ∗ = f . The following proposition shows that the
mRTB rule is self-dual.
Theorem 2 The mRTB rule is self-dual.
Proof Let (N , R, E, C) be a MIA situation. Remember that vRE,C and v
R
D−E,C
denote the bankruptcy games corresponding to the bankruptcy situations
(R, E, (ck N )k∈R) and (R, D − E, (ck N )k∈R), respectively. Then,






RTB(N , mτk (v
R
E,C ), Ck)


























RTB(N , mτk (v
R
D−E,C ), Ck)
= (cRi )i∈N − mRTB(N , R, D − E, C),
where for the second equality we apply Lemma 2 to the “diagonal” MIA situa-
tion corresponding to the bankruptcy situation among the issues, and for the third
equality we use self-duality of the RTB rule for bankruptcy situations (cf. Curiel
1988). We conclude that the mRTB rule is self-dual. 
Similarly, the following proposition shows that the RTB rule for MIA situations
(cf. Calleja et al. 2005) is self-dual.
Proposition 2 The RTB rule for MIA situations (cf. Calleja et al. 2005) is self-dual.
Proof Calleja et al. (2005) show that the RTB rule coincides with the Shapley value
of the associated cooperative game. So, for a MIA situation (N , R, E, C),














[(cRi )i∈N − mσrev(vD−E,C )]





= (cRi )i∈N − RTB(N , R, D − E, C).
This shows that the RTB rule is self-dual. 
As a result of this proposition, the RTB rule is self-dual for bankruptcy situa-
tions as well, which was first proved by Curiel (1988).
In a similar way, one can show that the composite rule indicated at the end of
Sect. 3, which applies the RTB rule twice, is self-dual.
5 Issue consistency and monotonicity
In this section we characterise the mRTB rule as a consistent extension of the RTB
rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of MIA situations. This so-called issue-
consistency, which is inspired by O’Neill’s claim-consistency, allows us to easily
establish estate monotonicity of the mRTB rule.
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Definition 2 A bankruptcy rule f is called claim-consistent (cf. O’Neill 1982) if
for each bankruptcy situation (N , E, c) the following relation holds:
fi (N , E, c) = 1
n
⎡
⎣min{E, ci } +
∑
j∈N\{i}




for all i ∈ N.
If a rule is claim-consistent, the solution can be viewed as an average of n pay-
offs. Each payoff is calculated by fixing a player j ∈ N and giving him as much
as possible, min{E, c j }; then, the remaining max{E − c j , 0} is shared among the
other players. Claim-consistency determines a unique rule for bankruptcy situa-
tions, which is the RTB rule.
For MIA situations we define a new kind of consistency. A rule is issue-con-
sistent if it can be expressed as an average of payoffs too, but now the payoffs are
calculated by fixing an issue k ∈ R and allocating to it the amount min{E, ck N },
while the part of the estate that is left is shared among the remaining issues.
Definition 3 A MIA rule f is called issue-consistent if for each MIA situation
(N , R, E, C) the following relation holds:





f (N , {k}, min{E, ck N }, Ck)




Issue-consistency allows us to extend any rule defined for bankruptcy situations
to MIA situations: the first term of the summation in (5) applies the rule f to a
(perhaps trivial) bankruptcy situation, while the second term applies f to a MIA
situation with r − 1 issues, so the expression can be recursively expanded until f
is used only on bankruptcy situations (i.e., MIA situations with only one issue).
Analogous to claim-consistency, every bankruptcy rule has a unique issue-consis-
tent extension. The next theorem shows that the mRTB rule is the issue-consistent
extension of the RTB rule.
Theorem 3 The mRTB rule is the only MIA rule that satisfies issue-consistency
and coincides with the RTB rule for bankruptcy problems.
Proof Let (N , R, E, C) be a MIA situation. Then






RTB(N , mτk (v
R
E,C ), Ck).
For each permutation τ on the issues, we split the second summation into one term
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Since mττ(n)(v
R
E,C ) = min{E, cτ(n)N } and there are (r−1)! permutations τ ∈ (R)
with τ(n) = k, we can write
γ = 1
r ! (r − 1)!
∑
k∈R







RTB(N , mτk (v
R
E,C ), Ck).
The mRTB rule coincides with RTB if there is only one issue, i.e.,
RTB(N , min{E, ck N }, Ck) = mRTB(N , {k}, min{E, ck N }, Ck).
Denoting by vR\{k} the bankruptcy game associated with the situation (R, max{E−





















Comparing the expression in brackets with the definition of mRTB given in Eq. (2)
yields









mRTB(N , R\{k}, max{E − ck N , 0}, C−k).
This shows that the mRTB rule is issue-consistent. This, together with the unique-
ness of issue-consistent extension, proves the result. 
In the following example, we show how issue-consistency can be used to com-
pute the mRTB solution of a MIA situation.
Example 4 Consider again the MIA situation of Example 3. As a first step in
computing the mRTB solution we follow O’Neill’s representation of the recur-
sive completion method (which yields the RTB solution) and construct the tree of
reduced problems shown in Fig. 2.
For each of the three issues we construct the reduced problem (in the second
column of matrices) in which this issue is fully satisfied (with the corresponding
payoffs stated above the reduced matrix), and the remaining estate (stated in front
of the matrix) has to be divided among the remaining issues. For each of the three
reduced problems, we again construct two reduced problems in the same way (third
column).
Next, we use issue-consistency to construct the mRTB solution, starting with
the reduced problems that have only one issue left. For these situations, mRTB coin-
cides with RTB and we can apply the latter to obtain the payoffs. For instance, in the
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43 0 1 24
24 2 0
0 1 24
26 0 2 6
24 2 0
24 2 0
25 0 2 6
0 1 24
0 1 24
18 24 2 0
24 2 0
17 0 1 24
0 2 6
18 24 2 0
24 2 0
0 0 2 6
0 2 6
17 0 1 24
0 1 24
0 0 2 6
Fig. 2 Forward step for Example 4
situation at the top of the third column, we get RTB(N , 18, (24, 2, 0)) = (17, 1, 0),
which is stated below the matrix, in Fig. 3.
Having done this for all one-issue situations, we apply issue-consistency to
construct the mRTB solutions of the bigger problems. Looking at the top problem
in the second column, issue-consistency requires that the mRTB allocation (again
stated below the matrix) is given by averaging over two vectors: one in which the
first issue is fully dealt with [yielding (0, 1, 24)+ (17, 1, 0) = (17, 2, 24)] and the
other in which the second issue is fully satisfied [yielding (24, 2, 0)+(0, 12 , 16 12 ) =
(24, 2 12 , 16
1
2 )]. Performing these computations for all remaining matrices (see
Fig. 3) results in mRTB(N , E, C) = ( 1306 , 236 , 1536 ).
As an example of how issue-consistency can be used, we show that the mRTB
rule is estate monotonic. A rule is called estate monotonic if no player gets less
when the estate increase.
Definition 4 A MIA rule f is estate monotonic if for every pair of MIA situations
(N , R, E, C) and (N , R, E ′, C) with E ′ ≥ E we have that
fi (N , R, E
′, C) ≥ fi (N , R, E, C)
for all i ∈ N.
Theorem 4 The mRTB rule is estate monotonic.
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Fig. 3 Backward step for Example 4
Proof We show that mRTB rule is monotonic by induction on the number of
issues r . If r = 1 then mRTB coincides with RTB and this rule is monotonic on
the class of bankruptcy games (cf. Curiel 1988).
Next, assume that mRTB is monotonic for situations with r − 1 issues. Let C
be a claim matrix with r rows. By issue-consistency we have





mRTB(N , {k}, min{E, ck N }, Ck)
+ mRTB(N , R\{k}, max{E − ck N , 0}, C−k)
]
.
In the first term inside the brackets we actually apply the RTB rule to a bankruptcy
situation. So, by monotonicity of the RTB rule, this term increases if the estate is
raised. The second term is the application of mRTB to a (r − 1)-issue allocation
situation, which by the induction hypothesis satisfies estate monotonicity. Adding
up all terms, we have that mRTB is estate monotonic. 
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